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CIVIL PROCEDURE—PLEADING: 
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT REVISITS 
THE PLEADING STANDARD UNDER 
BELL ATLANTIC CORP. V. TWOMBLY, 
MAKING SURVIVING A MOTION 
TO DISMISS MORE DIFFICULT 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) 
ABSTRACT 
 
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the United States Supreme Court held Javaid Iqbal 
failed to state a claim for Bivens liability against former United States 
Attorney General John Ashcroft and former Federal Bureau of Investigation 
Director Robert Mueller.  Iqbal was arrested and detained in the United 
States as a person of high interest in the wake of the September 11, 2001, 
terrorist attacks.  While in custody, Iqbal claimed he suffered both physical 
and verbal abuse.  Upon his release, Iqbal filed a Bivens action against 
several United States officials, including Ashcroft and Mueller as the 
alleged architects of a policy to confine individuals based solely on their 
race, religion, or natural origin, rather than because of any connection with 
terrorist activity.  Ashcroft and Mueller moved to dismiss Iqbal’s claim for 
failing to state sufficient allegations connecting them to any alleged uncon-
stitutional conduct.  Extending the “plausibility” pleading standard devised 
in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, the Supreme Court held Iqbal’s complaint was 
inadequate to state a claim for Bivens liability against Ashcroft and Mueller 
because it did not contain enough nonconclusory factual allegations to 
suggest plausible entitlement to relief.  The Iqbal decision makes clear the 
“plausibility” pleading standard applies to all federal civil actions, meaning 
all plaintiffs have to come forward with greater factual specificity in their 
complaints to survive a motion to dismiss.  The Iqbal decision will likely 
result in fewer claims, meritorious or otherwise, finding redress in federal 
courts.
           
384 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 86:383 
 
I.  FACTS ........................................................................................ 384 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND .......................................................... 386 
A.  BIVENS LIABILITY................................................................. 387 
B. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DOCTRINE ....................................... 388 
C. FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
PLEADING STANDARD.......................................................... 389 
III. ANALYSIS ................................................................................. 392 
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION...................................................... 392 
1.  Jurisdiction Pursuant to the Collateral- 
Order Doctrine ............................................................... 393 
2.  “Supervisory Liability” Unavailable Under Bivens...... 394 
3. Complaint Fails Twombly’s Plausibility Standard ....... 395 
B. JUSTICE SOUTER’S DISSENT................................................. 398 
1. Improper Elimination of Supervisory Liability .............. 398 
2. Misapplication of the Twombly Pleading Standard ...... 400 
C. JUSTICE BREYER’S DISSENT ................................................ 400 
IV. IMPACT...................................................................................... 401 
A. FEDERAL CIVIL LITIGATION ................................................ 401 
B. LEGISLATIVE ACTION .......................................................... 402 
C. NORTH DAKOTA STATE COURTS......................................... 403 
V. CONCLUSION........................................................................... 404 
 
I. FACTS 
In November 2001, respondent Javaid Iqbal was arrested and charged 
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) with possessing fraudulent 
identification documents and with conspiracy to defraud the United States.1  
 
1. Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04 CV 01809 JG SMG, 2005 WL 2375202, at *1 n.1 
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005).  At the district court level, the case name was Elmaghraby v. Aschroft. 
Id. at *1.  Co-plaintiff Elmaghraby settled his claim for $300,000 and was not part of the Supreme 
        
2010] CASE COMMENT 385 
Following his arrest, investigators considered Iqbal to be “of high interest” 
to the investigation of the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 
2001, and was held at the Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC) in 
Brooklyn, New York.2  As a high interest detainee, Iqbal was subjected to 
the MDC’s restrictive conditions until the end of July 2002, when he was 
relocated to the general prison population.3  Eventually, Iqbal pled guilty to 
the fraud charges and was deported to Pakistan in January 2003, which did 
not end his involvement with the United States’ judicial system.4 
In May 2004, Iqbal filed a twenty-one count Bivens action against 
thirty-four current and former federal officials and nineteen “John Doe” 
federal corrections officers, challenging his confinement in the MDC as a 
high interest detainee on both constitutional and statutory grounds.5  Iqbal 
asserted jailors “kicked him in the stomach, punched him in the face, and 
dragged him across” his cell floor without justification; subjected him to 
completely unnecessary strip and body cavity searches; and prohibited him 
from praying because there would be “[n]o prayers for terrorists.”6  It was 
Iqbal’s allegations against former United States Attorney General John 
Ashcroft and former FBI Director Robert Mueller, however, that formed the 
basis of his Supreme Court appeal.7 
 
Court appeal.  Brief for Respondent at 39, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (No. 07-
1015). 
2. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.2d 143, 147-48 (2d Cir. 2007).  The case name at the court of 
appeals level was Iqbal v. Hasty. Id. at 143.  Defendant Dennis Hasty was the Warden of the 
MDC during the time of Iqbal’s confinement. Id. at 147. 
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, FBI and Department of Justice 
officials commenced a large scale investigation to identify those responsible and prevent any 
subsequent attacks.  DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., THE SEPTEMBER 11 
DETAINEES:  A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN 
CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS 1 (2003), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0306/full.pdf?bcsi_scan_61073EC0F74759AD=0.  Within three 
days, more than 4000 FBI special agents and 3000 support personnel were assigned to the probe. 
Id. at 11.  By September 18, 2001, the FBI had already received over 96,000 tips, resulting in 
more than 1200 individuals being questioned, 762 of which were detained on immigration 
charges. Id. at 1-2, 11. 
Of those detained, 184 were considered to be “of high interest” to the investigation and held 
in high security federal prisons, such as the MDC. Id. at 111.  The remainder of the detainees were 
considered to be “of interest” to the investigation and held in lower security facilities. Id.  High 
interest detainees were held under the most restrictive conditions allowable under Bureau of 
Prisons (BOP) policy to prevent them from communicating with anyone until cleared by the FBI. 
Id. at 112.  Conditions included twenty-three hours a day lockdown and continuous four officer 
escorts in handcuffs and leg irons when outside cells. Iqbal, 490 F.2d at 148. 
3. Iqbal, 490 F.2d at 148. 
4. Id. at 149. 
5. Id.; First Amended Complaint ¶¶ 10-44, Elmaghraby, No. 04 CV 01809 JG SMG, 2005 
WL 2375202. See infra Part IIA (summarizing a Bivens action). 
6. Complaint ¶¶ 82, 113, 123, 143-45, 154, Elmaghraby, No. 04 CV 01809 JG SMG, 2005 
WL 2375202. 
7. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1944 (2009). 
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Iqbal claimed he was classified as a high interest detainee solely based 
on his race, religion, and national origin, and not because of any link to 
terrorist activity.8  Moreover, Iqbal asserted the classification was made 
according to an unconstitutional policy that Ashcroft created and Mueller 
oversaw.9  Additionally, Iqbal alleged Ashcroft and Mueller “knew of, 
condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to [expose him to harsh] 
conditions of confinement as a matter of policy, solely on account of [his] 
religion, race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate penological inter-
est.”10  According to Iqbal, these purported indiscretions by Ashcroft and 
Mueller amounted to violations of his First and Fifth Amendment rights.11 
In response, Ashcroft and Mueller moved to dismiss Iqbal’s complaint 
for failing to state sufficient allegations showing their involvement in the 
alleged unconstitutional conduct.12  The district court denied their motion, 
and Ashcroft and Mueller filed an interlocutory appeal in the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.13  Affirming the relevant part of 
the district court’s decision, the Second Circuit held that Iqbal’s complaint 
adequately alleged Ashcroft and Mueller’s personal involvement in dis-
criminatory decisions, which, if true, clearly violated the Constitution.14  
Ashcroft and Mueller appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which 
granted certiorari and reversed the Second Circuit’s decision.15 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution states, 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”16  Additionally, the Fifth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution provides, “[n]o person 
shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law.”17  In Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents,18 the Supreme 
 
8. Complaint, supra note 6, ¶ 45. 
9. Id. ¶¶ 10-11, 47. 
10. Id. ¶ 96. 
11. Id. ¶¶ 232, 235. 
12. Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04 CV 01809 JG SMG, 2005 WL 2375202, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 27, 2005). 
13. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 147 (2d Cir. 2007). 
14. Id. at 174.  Although the decision was unanimous, Second Circuit Judge Cabranes wrote 
a concurrence in which he stated the Supreme Court’s pleading standard after Bell Atlantic Corp. 
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), is “less than crystal clear and fully deserve[s] reconsidera-
tion . . . at the earliest opportunity.” Id. at 178 (Cabranes, J., concurring). 
15. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1945 (2009). 
16. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
17. Id. at amend. V. 
18. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
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Court ruled that a federal agent acting under color of authority may be held 
civilly liable for unconstitutional conduct.19  As the Court recognized in 
Mitchell v. Forsyth,20 however, to avoid the distractions of unmeritorious 
litigation and the dissuasion from public service that such suits might cause, 
federal officials enjoy qualified immunity.21 
To give effect to the qualified immunity doctrine early in the litigation, 
the complaint must either sufficiently allege the official violated clearly 
established law or be subject to dismissal.22  According to the Court’s most 
recent articulation of the pleading standard in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly,23 a legally sufficient complaint states a claim that is “plausible on 
its face.”24  A claim is plausible when, without using legal conclusions, it 
allows the court to draw a reasonable inference the defendant is liable for 
the alleged misconduct.25  An in-depth examination of these legal concepts 
is necessary to gain a complete understanding of the Court’s decision in 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal.26 
A. BIVENS LIABILITY 
In Bivens, the Supreme Court for the first time held agents acting under 
color of authority faced civil liability for violating an individual’s Fourth 
Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures.27  Bivens 
involved a warrantless search and arrest for an alleged narcotics violation.28  
Federal agents entered Bivens’ apartment and handcuffed him in front of 
his wife and children, while threatening to arrest the entire family.29  
Thereafter, Bivens was taken to a federal courthouse where he was interro-
gated, booked, and strip-searched.30  Although such a claim had never been 
allowed to proceed, Bivens filed a lawsuit seeking redress for these alleged 
violations of his Fourth Amendment rights.31  Based on the concept that 
 
19. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389. 
20. 472 U.S. 511 (1985). 
21. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526. 
22. Id. 
23. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
24. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 
25. Id. at 555-56. 
26. 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009). 
27. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971).  A Bivens 
action is now regarded at the federal equivalent to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, where state officials can be 
sued for violations of individuals’ constitutional rights.  Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 254 n.2 
(2006).  The difference is that section 1983 actions were statutorily created, while Bivens actions 
were judicially created. Id. 
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having a constitutional right implies a remedy for its violation, the Court 
concluded Bivens stated a cause of action under the Fourth Amendment.32 
Since Bivens, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to extend liability 
to other violations of constitutional rights by federal agents due to the 
Court’s discomfort with implied rights of action and its belief that Congress 
is best equipped to devise new remedies.33  While Bivens liability has been 
expanded to include violations of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause and the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Clause, the Court has expressly declined to do so in the First Amendment 
arena.34  Nonetheless, even if Bivens liability applies to a given constitu-
tional violation, a federal agent’s qualified immunity serves as another 
hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome. 
B. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DOCTRINE 
All government officials enjoy at least qualified immunity, which 
protects them from civil liability to the extent their conduct does not im-
pinge upon clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.35  The 
policy behind qualified immunity is to protect both government function 
and individual rights.36  Without such immunity, the concern is that 
litigation will divert attention away from official duties, cause second-
guessing of official decisions, and deter otherwise qualified people from 
entering public service.37  At the same time, the immunity is qualified, 
rather than absolute, to ensure there is adequate incentive to keep officials 
from violating clearly established constitutional or statutory rights.38 
In keeping with the policy of protecting government function, qualified 
immunity is recognized as both a defense to liability and a limited right not 
to stand trial or face discovery burdens.39  To give effect to qualified 
immunity early in the litigation, courts ask whether the facts alleged show 
the official violated a constitutional right that was clearly established at the 
time in question.40  A court is to consider whether a reasonable officer in 
 
32. Id. at 397. 
33. See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68 (2001). 
34. See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 390 (1983) (First Amendment); Carlson v. Green, 446 
U.S. 14, 25 (1980) (Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause); Davis v. 
Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248-49 (1979) (Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause). 
35. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).  Some government officials enjoy 
absolute immunity from suit, including:  legislators in their legislative functions, judges in their 
judicial functions, and the President of the United States in official acts. Id. at 807. 
36. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506 (1978). 
37. Harlow, 475 U.S. at 814. 
38. Id. at 819. 
39. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). 
40. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201-02 (2001). 
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the defendant’s position would have known his or her conduct was uncon-
stitutional to determine if the right was clearly established.41  It follows that 
an official is only liable for his or her own unconstitutional conduct and 
cannot be held responsible solely under a theory of respondeat superior, 
where employers answer for the wrongs of their employees.42  Therefore, to 
overcome qualified immunity, the plaintiff seeking to hold a high-level 
official responsible must show the policymaker created, with a discrimina-
tory purpose, a policy under which his or her subordinates acted unconstitu-
tionally.43  Accordingly, at the pleading stage of litigation, surmounting 
such a policymaker’s qualified immunity means the complaint must allege 
sufficient facts, assumed to be true, that state a plausible claim of purpose-
ful discrimination.44 
C. FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PLEADING STANDARD 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules) require a complaint to 
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 
entitled to relief.”45  Illustrating the “simplicity and brevity that these rules 
contemplate,” the example complaint provided in Form 11 of the Rules’ 
Appendix of Forms states only:  “[o]n date, at place, the defendant negli-
gently drove a motor vehicle against the plaintiff.”46  The relaxed pleading 
requirement is only concerned with giving the defendant notice of the claim 
and its bases, reserving to discovery and trial the resolution of the merits.47  
Although the pleading standard may be lenient, a complaint may still be 
subject to dismissal if it fails to state such a claim.48 
 
41. Id. at 202. 
42. Robertson v. Sichel, 127 U.S. 507, 515-16 (1888). 
43. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). 
44. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 
45. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
46. Id. at 84; Id. at app. form 11. 
47. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513-14 (2002).  The modern Rules were 
fashioned in this way in response to the difficulties associated with the more technical Field Code.  
Jack B. Weinstein & Daniel H. Distiller, Comments on Procedural Reform, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 
518, 522 (1957).  The Field Code was developed in New York by David Dudley Field in 1848. Id. 
at 520.  Under the Field Code, a plaintiff was required to plead facts constituting a cause of action, 
rather than conclusions, with the result being that the number of complaints was drastically 
reduced. Id.  The problem with the Field Code approach was that it was difficult to distinguish 
between facts and conclusions. Id. at 520-21.  In response, the drafters of the modern Rules 
purposely avoided using the words “facts” or “conclusions” in drafting Rule 8.  5 CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1216 (3d ed. 2009).  
Note that modified versions of the Field Code are still used in some states, including New York 
and California.  John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts:  A Survey 
on State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367, 1378 (1986). 
48. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
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The foundational decision of what it means to state a claim under Rule 
8(a) is Conley v. Gibson.49  In Conley, African-American railroad workers 
claimed their union failed to represent them against discriminatory dis-
charges by the railroad, thereby violating the Railway Labor Act.50  The un-
ion moved to dismiss the complaint because it lacked factual specificity.51 
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Black rejected the union’s argu-
ment, stating all Rule 8 requires is a “short and plain statement of the claim 
that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and 
the grounds upon which it rests.”52  Justice Black also made the famous 
assertion that “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a 
claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of 
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”53  A relaxed 
pleading standard is permissible, according to Justice Black, because of 
generous discovery and pretrial rules that can be used by either party to fur-
ther refine and specify an opponent’s claim or defense.54  Conley has been 
cited as authority in at least sixteen Supreme Court opinions and by twenty-
six state supreme courts in interpreting the states’ own rules of civil 
procedure.55 
One of the Supreme Court’s applications of Conley is in the context of 
qualified immunity:  Crawford-El v. Britton.56  In Crawford-El, a prisoner 
sued a corrections officer in a section 1983 action for alleged First Amend-
ment violations.57  Recognizing the need to give effect to qualified immu-
nity early in litigation, the Court stated a district court may require the 
plaintiff to “put forward specific, nonconclusory factual allegations that 
establish improper motive causing cognizable injury in order to survive a 
prediscovery motion for dismissal.”58 
Four years later, however, the Court indicated, in Swierkiewicz v. 
Sorema N.A.,59 that Crawford-El did not impose a heightened pleading 
 
49. 355 U.S. 41 (1957); 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 47, § 1215. 
50. Conley, 355 U.S. at 43. 
51. Id. at 47. 
52. Id. (quoting FED R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)). 
53. Id. at 45-46 (emphasis added). 
54. Id. at 47-48. 
55. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 578 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
56. 523 U.S. 574 (1998). 
57. Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 578-79. 
58. Id. at 598 (quoting Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 236 (1991) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring)).  In Siegert, Justice Kennedy specifically called for a heightened pleading standard in 
civil actions with malicious intent as an element of the claim.  Siegert, 500 U.S. at 235-36. 
59. 534 U.S. 506 (2002). 
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standard, which can only be accomplished by amending the Rules.60  None-
theless, the call for nonconclusory allegations in pleadings made a reprise a 
few years later in the context of an anti-trust claim.61 
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, consumers sued the four main 
national telephone and internet service providers for alleged violations of 
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.62  Plaintiffs asserted the defendant companies 
agreed to avoid competing with one another and prevent competitive entry 
into the market.63  In support of their claim, the plaintiffs’ complaint cited 
the absence of upstart service providers in any of the companies’ markets 
and the lack of competition amongst the companies within each other’s 
markets as evidence of their parallel conduct.64  Such parallel conduct, 
according to the plaintiffs, led to the conclusion that an explicit agreement 
to limit competition had been formed between the companies, in violation 
of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.65  However, the Supreme Court held these 
allegations insufficient to state an anti-trust claim under its new “plausible” 
pleading standard.66 
Writing for the seven-two majority in Twombly, Justice Souter began 
with the concept that although Rule 8(a)(2) only requires a “short and plain 
statement of the claim,” a plaintiff’s grounds for relief must rest on “more 
than labels and conclusions, [or] a formulaic recitation of the elements.”67  
Further, though all allegations in the complaint are assumed to be true for 
the purposes of a motion to dismiss, the Court did not have to accept legal 
conclusions as true.68  Accordingly, the Court did not have to assume as 
true the “legal conclusion” that the companies had unlawfully conspired to 
restrain competition.69  The Court then evaluated the remaining “noncon-
clusory” allegations in the plaintiffs’ complaint under its “plausible” 
pleading standard.70 
 
60. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 515.  Rule 9(b) is an example of a heightened pleading stan-
dard, which provides, “[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the 
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a 
person’s mind may be alleged generally.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).  
61. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 
62. Id. at 550 n.1.  The four named defendants were Bell South Corporation, Qwest Com-
munications International, Inc., SBC Communications, Inc., and Verizon Communications, Inc. 
(formerly Bell Atlantic Corporation). Id. 
63. Id. at 550. 
64. Id. at 550-51. 
65. Id. at 551. 
66. Id. at 570. 
67. Id. at 555. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at 557. 
70. Id. at 565-70. 
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Retiring Conley’s “no set of facts” language, Justice Souter described 
that a complaint must contain sufficient “nonconclusory” factual matter, 
taken as true, to “plausibly” suggest illegal conduct.71  Plausible entitlement 
to relief requires a complaint to provide enough facts to give a “reasonable 
expectation” of recovery.72  Turning to the plaintiffs’ allegations of parallel 
conduct, the Court held that while such behavior was consistent with an 
illegal accord amongst the companies, it was more likely explained by legal 
free-market conduct.73  As such, because the plaintiffs failed to “nudge their 
claims across the line from conceivable to plausible,” their complaint was 
dismissed.74  Lower courts struggled to apply Twombly, with many wonder-
ing whether it applied to all civil cases or just to anti-trust and other large 
discovery actions.75  In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Supreme Court took the 
opportunity to further refine and explain its new “plausible” pleading 
standard. 
III. ANALYSIS 
In Iqbal, Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito joined.76  The 
majority held the allegations in Iqbal’s complaint were insufficient to state a 
plausible claim of purposeful discrimination by Ashcroft and Mueller.77  
Justice Souter dissented, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsberg, and Breyer.78  
Justice Breyer also filed a separate dissenting opinion.79 
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION 
The issue before the Court was whether Iqbal pled sufficient facts, 
taken as true, to plausibly suggest Ashcroft and Mueller deprived him of his 
clearly established constitutional rights.80  Before addressing the merits of 
the case, the Court determined it had subject matter jurisdiction over the 
interlocutory appeal under the collateral-order doctrine.81  Next, the Court 
decided Iqbal’s “supervisory liability” theory was a “misnomer” for 
 
71. Id. at 556, 562-63. 
72. Id. at 556.  
73. Id. at 566. 
74. Id. at 570. 
75. E.g., Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 155-58 (2d Cir. 2007). 
76. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1941 (2009). 
77. Id. at 1942-43. 
78. Id. at 1954. 
79. Id. at 1961. 
80. Id. at 1942-43. 
81. Id. at 1947. 
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respondeat superior liability, which is unavailable to Bivens plaintiffs.82  As 
such, for Iqbal’s complaint to survive, the Court required the complaint’s 
factual allegations must plausibly suggest Ashcroft and Mueller created and 
operated a detention policy that purposely discriminated based on race, 
religion, or national origin.83 
Turning to Iqbal’s complaint, the Court determined many of the allega-
tions were legal conclusions, which are not entitled to the assumption of 
truth.84  Of the remaining nonconclusory allegations, the Court considered 
those concerning Ashcroft and Mueller to be just as consistent with lawful 
behavior as unlawful behavior, making intentional discrimination by 
Ashcroft and Muller not plausible under Twombly.85  Thus, the Court 
concluded Iqbal’s complaint should be dismissed for failing to state a claim 
with respect to Ashcroft and Mueller.86 
1. Jurisdiction Pursuant to the Collateral-Order Doctrine 
Part of Iqbal’s argument was that the Supreme Court did not have 
subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case because Ashcroft and Mueller 
were appealing the denial of their motion to dismiss, which is a non-final 
decision.87  Accordingly, as a preliminary matter, the Court had to decide 
whether it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal.88  The Court explained limit-
ed types of district court orders are reviewable under the collateral-order 
doctrine, even though the matter out of which they arose is not yet final.89  
Orders that come within the collateral-order doctrine are those that “finally 
determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in 
the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the 
cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the 
whole case is adjudicated.”90  Further, the Court described orders denying 
qualified immunity are important and separate enough to implicate the 
collateral-order doctrine, so long as the denial was based on a question of 
law.91  The Court stated evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint is a legal 
 
82. Id. at 1948-49. 
83. Id. at 1949. 
84. Id. at 1951. 
85. Id. at 1951-52. 
86. Id. at 1954. 
87. Brief for Respondent, supra note 1, at 13.  The courts of appeals are only granted 
jurisdiction over decisions that are final.  28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000). 
88. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1945. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949)). 
91. Id. at 1945-47. 
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issue.92  Therefore, since the denial of Ashcroft and Mueller’s motion to 
dismiss turned on a question of law and rejected their qualified immunity 
defense, it was a decision within the scope of the collateral-order doctrine, 
giving the Court jurisdiction to hear it.93  With the issue of jurisdiction 
settled, the Court proceeded to the substantive issues of Ashcroft and 
Mueller’s appeal.94 
2. “Supervisory Liability” Unavailable Under Bivens 
The first merit-based issue the Court considered was the proper scope 
of Bivens liability against defendants with qualified immunity, like Ashcroft 
and Mueller.95  The Court began by analyzing whether Bivens applied to 
Iqbal’s claim at all.96  Citing past hesitance to expand Bivens liability to 
new areas and types of defendants, the Court noted it had previously re-
fused to extend such liability to First Amendment Free Exercise Clause 
claims.97  According to the Court, this observation alone may have been 
enough to dismiss Iqbal’s religious discrimination claim, but for purposes 
of the appeal, the Court would assume a free exercise claim was allowable 
under Bivens.98  After tentatively establishing Bivens’ applicability, the 
Court evaluated to what and whom it applied.99 
Starting with the concept that federal officials cannot be held liable 
under Bivens using only respondeat superior, the Court remarked a Bivens 
plaintiff must allege that each defendant individually committed clearly 
unconstitutional acts.100  According to the Court, when claiming unlawful 
discrimination under the First and Fifth Amendments, a plaintiff must assert 
the defendant discriminated purposely.101  Iqbal argued Ashcroft and 
Mueller could be held liable under the theory of “supervisory liability” for 
“knowing acquiescence” to the unconstitutional conduct of their 
subordinates.102 
 




96. Id. at 1948. 
97. Id.  (citing Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 390 (1983)).  The Court noted that Bivens 
liability has been extended to include Fifth Amendment due process claims like Iqbal’s. Id. (citing 
Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 228-29 (1983)). 
98. Id. 
99. Id. 
100. Id.  Iqbal conceded in his brief a Bivens plaintiff may not establish liability solely by 
respondeat superior.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 1, at 46. 
101. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009). 
102. Brief for Respondent, supra note 1, at 45-46. 
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The Court disagreed, stating where a plaintiff seeks to hold high-level 
officials liable for an alleged unconstitutional policy, more than awareness 
of discrimination is required.103  Rather, such a plaintiff must illustrate the 
policymaker implemented the decision “because of, not merely in spite of, 
[the action’s] adverse effects upon an identifiable group.”104  “Supervisory 
liability,” according to the Court, was a “misnomer” for respondeat 
superior, which is unavailable to a Bivens plaintiff.105  Thus, for Iqbal to 
prevail over Ashcroft and Mueller’s qualified immunity, he must “plead 
sufficient factual matter to show that [Ashcroft and Mueller] adopted and 
implemented the detention policies at issue not for a neutral, investigative 
reason[,] but for the purpose of discriminating on account of race, religion, 
or national origin.”106  The Court then evaluated whether Iqbal’s complaint 
met this standard.107 
3. Complaint Fails Twombly’s Plausibility Standard 
In determining the sufficiency of Iqbal’s complaint, the Court started 
with the proposition that Rule 8 does not mandate meticulous fact pleading, 
but it does require more than just “‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic 
recitation of the elements of a cause of action.’”108  According to the Court, 
a legally sufficient complaint must contain enough factual content to make 
it plausible, meaning the complaint permits a judge to make a “reasonable 
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”109  The 
Court then described it is a two-step process under Twombly.  First, a court 
must parse out legal conclusions from nonconclusory allegations.110  While 
legal conclusions can serve as the structure for the complaint, only noncon-
clusory assertions are entitled to the assumption of truth.111  Second, a court 
must determine whether the remaining nonconclusory allegations “state[] a 
plausible claim for relief” by using its “judicial experience and common 
sense.”112  The Court remarked if the nonconclusory statements do no more 
than illustrate the possibility of unlawful behavior, a plaintiff has failed to 
suggest entitlement to relief, and the complaint should be dismissed.113  
 
103. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948. 
104. Id. (quoting Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)). 
105. Id. at 1949. 
106. Id. at 1948-49. 
107. Id. at 1948. 
108. Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 1949-50. 
111. Id. at 1950. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
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After outlining the two-step approach to evaluating complaints, the Court 
examined whether Iqbal’s complaint met the requirements.114 
Using the first part of the Twombly test, the Court began its assessment 
of Iqbal’s complaint by separating his conclusory allegations from his non-
conclusory allegations.115  Iqbal claimed Ashcroft and Mueller “knew of, 
condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject [him] to [harsh] 
conditions of confinement as a matter of policy, solely on account of [his] 
religion, race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate penological 
interest.”116  Further, Iqbal stated Ashcroft was the “principal architect” of 
the discriminatory policy, and Mueller was “instrumental” in its implemen-
tation.117  The Court compared these statements to the anti-trust conspiracy 
allegations in Twombly, which were no more than a “‘formulaic recitation 
of the elements’ of a constitutional discrimination claim.”118  As such, the 
Court reasoned these allegations were legal conclusions that are not 
assumed to be true.119  With the first part of the Twombly analysis complete, 
the Court proceeded to consider whether Iqbal’s remaining nonconclusory 
allegations established a plausible claim for relief.120 
The Court commenced the second phase of the Twombly analysis by 
indicating which of Iqbal’s allegations against Ashcroft and Mueller were 
nonconclusory.121  One of the assertions the Court deemed nonconclusory 
was that “the [FBI], under the direction of Defendant MUELLER, arrested 
and detained thousands of Arab Muslim men . . . as a part of its investi-
gation of the events of September 11.”122  Further, the Court also labeled as 
nonconclusory Iqbal’s statement that “[t]he policy of holding post-
September 11th detainees in highly restrictive conditions of confinement 
until they were ‘cleared’ by the FBI was approved by Defendants 
ASHCROFT and MUELLER in discussions in the weeks after September 
11, 2001.”123  The Court concluded while these nonconclusory statements 
are assumed true and consistent with Iqbal’s ultimate claim that Ashcroft 
and Mueller created a policy that purposely detained him on the basis of his 
 
114. Id. at 1951. 
115. Id. 
116. First Amended Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 96. 
117. Id. ¶¶ 10-11. 




122. Id.; Complaint, supra note 6, ¶ 47. 
123. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951; Complaint, supra note 6, ¶ 69. 
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race, religion, or national origin, a “more likely explanation[] . . .” 
existed.124 
The Court reasoned because the events of September 11th were com-
mitted by Arab Muslim members of Al Qaeda, it should be expected the 
investigation into those involved would have a disproportionate effect on 
Arab Muslims, even if such an impact was not intended.125  Therefore, the 
policy created and implemented by Ashcroft and Mueller was “likely lawful 
and justified by [a] nondiscriminatory intent to detain aliens who were 
illegally present in the United States and who had potential connections to 
those who committed terrorist acts.”126  This “obvious alternative explana-
tion” to Iqbal’s nonconclusory factual allegations made purposeful discri-
mination by Ashcroft and Mueller an unreasonable inference.127  Thus, the 
Court held Iqbal’s claims against Ashcroft and Mueller did not pass the 
plausibility pleading standard under Twombly.128  Before remanding the 
case to the Court of Appeals for a determination of whether Iqbal should be 
allowed to amend his complaint, the Court addressed his additional 
arguments.129 
Iqbal posed three additional arguments to the Court, all of which were 
rejected.130  First, Iqbal contended Twombly’s holding was limited to the 
anti-trust context.131  The Court stated because Twombly was an interpre-
tation of Rule 8, Twombly applied to all federal civil actions.132  Second, 
Iqbal asserted his claim should be allowed to proceed because the district 
court could structure discovery in a way that would protect Ashcroft and 
Mueller’s qualified immunity defense until such protection was no longer 
warranted.133  The Court replied just because discovery could be carefully 
managed did not mean an insufficient complaint should be allowed to 
proceed.134  Finally, Iqbal claimed because Rule 9(b) allows a defendant’s 
intent to be stated generally, his nonspecific allegations of Ashcroft and 
Mueller’s discriminatory intent were sufficient.135  The Court responded 
Iqbal’s assertions about Ashcroft and Mueller’s discriminatory purpose 
 
124. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. at 1951-52. 
128. Id. at 1952. 
129. Id. at 1953. 
130. Id. at 1953-54. 
131. Brief for Respondent, supra note 1, at 37-38. 
132. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953. 
133. Brief for Respondent, supra note 1, at 27. 
134. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953. 
135. Brief for Respondent, supra note 1, at 32. 
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were still conclusory, which Rule 8(a)’s pleading standard did not 
countenance.136  With the three issues resolved, the Court concluded Iqbal’s 
complaint failed to state a claim of unconstitutional discrimination against 
Ashcroft and Mueller.137  Accordingly, the Court of Appeals’ decision was 
reversed and remanded to determine whether Iqbal should be allowed to 
amend his complaint.138 
B. JUSTICE SOUTER’S DISSENT 
Justice Souter dissented, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsberg, and 
Breyer.139  Justice Souter disagreed with the Court’s opinion on two 
grounds.140  First, Justice Souter contended the majority inappropriately 
eliminated all forms of supervisory liability from Bivens actions.141  
Second, Justice Souter argued the majority misinterpreted the Twombly 
pleading standard in determining Iqbal’s complaint failed to state a 
claim.142 
1. Improper Elimination of Supervisory Liability 
Justice Souter’s first disagreement with the majority concerned what he 
considered to be the Court’s unnecessary exclusion of supervisory liability 
from Bivens actions.143  Initially, Justice Souter explained the Court was not 
asked to decide viability of supervisory liability under Bivens.144  The Court 
was asked whether a high-level government official may be held liable for 
having “constructive notice” of subordinate officials’ discriminatory 
actions.145  However, Justice Souter argued the theory of Iqbal’s case was 
 
136. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1954. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). 




144. Id. at 1956. 
145. Id.  The Court granted certiorari on two questions: 
1. Whether a conclusory allegation that a cabinet-level officer or other high-ranking 
official knew of, condoned, or agreed to subject a plaintiff to allegedly unconstitu-
tional acts purportedly committed by subordinate officials is sufficient to state individ-
ual-capacity claims against those officials under Bivens; [and] 2. Whether a cabinet-
level officer or other high-ranking official may be held personally liable for the 
allegedly unconstitutional acts of subordinate officials on the ground that, as high level 
supervisors, they had constructive notice of the discrimination allegedly carried out by 
such subordinate officials. 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at I, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (No. 07-1015).  Justice Souter noted the 
first question concerned the sufficiency of Iqbal’s complaint while the second involved the 
standard for liability.  Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1955-56 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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never “constructive notice[;]” it was “knowing acquiescence” by Ashcroft 
and Mueller to their subordinates’ unconstitutional behavior.146  Moreover, 
Justice Souter pointed out Ashcroft and Mueller conceded they could be 
held liable under supervisory liability if they had “actual knowledge” of 
unconstitutional conduct by their subordinates and showed “deliberate 
indifference” to that knowledge.147 
Despite the parties’ agreement on the appropriate supervisory liability 
standard, Justice Souter noted the Court nonetheless chose to determine 
supervisory liability’s proper scope.148  According to Justice Souter, by 
choosing to ignore the parties’ concessions, the Court decided an issue 
without the benefit of full briefing.149  As a result, Justice Souter argued not 
only did the Court unfairly deny Iqbal an opportunity to be heard on the 
issue, the Court made an uninformed decision by failing to appreciate the 
difference between respondeat superior and other forms of supervisory 
liability.150 
Justice Souter claimed because the majority chose to decide the scope 
of supervisory liability under Bivens without full briefing, the Court 
improperly equated supervisory liability with respondeat superior.151  
Although officials cannot be held liable for the conduct of subordinates 
based solely on respondeat superior, Justice Souter described there may be 
some instances where supervisors should answer for the actions of their 
subordinates.152  Justice Souter provided examples of possible tests for 
supervisory liability, including “where a supervisor has actual knowledge of 
a subordinate’s constitutional violation and acquiesces.”153 
Nonetheless, Justice Souter ultimately concluded neither he, nor the 
majority, were in a position to implement or eliminate any given test for 
supervisory liability without full briefing and argument on the matter.154  
Finally, Justice Souter contended the Court’s examination of supervisory 
liability was unnecessary in the first place because it rejected Iqbal’s 
 
146. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1955-56. 
147. Id. (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 145, at 29).  Again, in Ashcroft 
and Mueller’s brief, they admitted they could be held liable for having “actual knowledge of the 
assertedly discriminatory nature of the classification of [the] suspects . . . and they were deliber-
ately indifferent to that discrimination.”  Brief for the Petitioners at 50, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (No. 
07-1015). 
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149. Id. at 1957. 
150. Id. at 1957-58. 
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“conclusory” supervisory liability allegations by using an “unsound” 
interpretation of Twombly.155 
2. Misapplication of the Twombly Pleading Standard 
Justice Souter’s second disagreement with the majority involved what 
he considered to be the Court’s misinterpretation of the pleading standard 
under Twombly.156  Justice Souter remarked the relevant question under 
Twombly is “whether, assuming the factual allegations are true, the plaintiff 
has stated a ground for relief that is plausible.”157  Justice Souter described 
how Iqbal’s complaint not only claimed Ashcroft and Mueller were aware 
of and consented to the use of discriminatory practices by their subor-
dinates, but they were also responsible for creating the policy.158  According 
to Justice Souter, Iqbal’s allegations were not “naked legal conclusions nor 
consistent with legal conduct,” unlike the parallel conduct asserted in 
Twombly.159  Moreover, Justice Souter claimed the majority’s error in dis-
missing certain statements in Iqbal’s complaint as conclusory was the result 
of looking at them standing alone.160  When taken in context with the other 
“nonconclusory” allegations in Iqbal’s complaint, Justice Souter considered 
it clear that Iqbal claimed Ashcroft and Mueller created and oversaw a 
specifically described discriminatory policy.161  As such, Souter concluded 
Iqbal had stated sufficient facts to state a plausible claim for relief against 
Ashcroft and Mueller and had given them proper notice of the claim and its 
foundation.162 
C. JUSTICE BREYER’S DISSENT 
Justice Breyer joined in Justice Souter’s dissent, but wrote separately to 
address the issue of unmeritous litigation interfering with government 
 
155. Id. 
156. Id. at 1959.  Note that Justice Souter was the author of the Twombly opinion.  Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007). 
157. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1959. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. at 1960. 
160. Id.  For reference, the Court considered the following allegations conclusory:  (1) that 
Ashcroft was the “principal architect” of the discriminatory policy; (2) that Mueller was “instru-
mental” in implementing the discriminatory policy; and (3) that Ashcroft and Mueller “knew of, 
condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject [Iqbal] to harsh conditions . . . as a 
matter of policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin and for no legiti-
mate penological interest.” Id. at 1951 (quoting First Amended Complaint, supra note 5, ¶¶ 10-11, 
96). 
161. Id. at 1960. 
162. Id. at 1961. 
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function.163  Although Justice Breyer shared the Court’s concern over 
unwarranted litigation, he believed trial courts are capable of managing dis-
covery in ways that protect officials’ qualified immunity until such protect-
tion is no longer necessary.164  For example, Justice Breyer provided a court 
could subject lower-level officials to discovery first to determine whether to 
permit discovery against higher-level officials.165  For this reason, and for 
those set forth in Justice Souter’s dissent, Justice Breyer would have upheld 
Iqbal’s complaint.166 
IV. IMPACT 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal is already being called “[t]he most consequential 
decision of the Supreme Court’s last term [even though it] got only a little 
attention when it landed in May.”167  Indeed, although the Iqbal decision 
was just handed down on May 18, 2009, over 16,900 federal cases have 
already cited to it.168  Thomas C. Goldstein, Supreme Court advocate and 
founder of SCOTUSblog, remarked, “Iqbal is the most significant Supreme 
Court decision in a decade for day-to-day litigation in federal courts.”169  
Iqbal’s impact on civil litigation has already been noticed by members of 
Congress, who have proposed new legislation to curb its effect.170  Finally, 
it is unclear what influence Iqbal will have on North Dakota’s state courts 
because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Supreme Court deci-
sions interpreting them only govern proceedings in federal court.171 
A. FEDERAL CIVIL LITIGATION 
Iqbal will have a significant effect on everyday federal civil litiga-
tion.172  For plaintiffs, Iqbal means greater difficulty in surviving a motion 
 
163. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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165. Id. at 1961-62. 
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167. Adam Liptak, 9/11 Case Could Bring Broad Shift on Civil Suits, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 
2009, at A10. 
168. Shepardize Result, LEXISNEXIS, http://www.lexisnexis.com (follow “Shepard’s” hyper-
link; then enter the citation “129 S. Ct. 1937” and follow “Check”) (last visited Dec. 13, 2010). 
169. Liptak, supra note 167.  Thomas C. Goldstein is a partner at Akin Gump Strauss Hauer 
& Feld in Washington, D.C.  AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP, http://www. 
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170. See Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009). 
171. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
172. Liptak, supra note 167. 
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to dismiss.173  To avoid dismissal, complaints are now required to have 
more factual specificity, or risk having allegations be deemed conclusory or 
not suggestive of plausible entitlement to relief.174  The potential problem 
for plaintiffs is that information necessary to make a complaint sufficient 
under Iqbal may be in the defendant’s head, or otherwise in his, her, or its 
sole possession.175  As Judge Posner described, this creates “a Catch-22 
situation in which a complaint is dismissed because of the plaintiff’s inabil-
ity to obtain essential information without pretrial discovery . . . that she 
could not conduct before filing the complaint.”176  While Iqbal is problem-
atic for plaintiffs, it is advantageous for defendants. 
Iqbal represents a new device for defendants to curtail lawsuits before 
they reach expensive and time-intensive discovery.177  For example, Iqbal 
has already been used to dismiss a major lawsuit against the pharmaceutical 
company AstraZeneca and an Alien Tort Claims Act suit against Coca-
Cola.178  The defense community regards Iqbal as a much-needed check on 
plaintiffs with scantly pled complaints being allowed to subject defendants 
to millions of dollars in discovery in hopes of leveraging settlement pres-
sure.179  However, Iqbal’s benefits to defendants may be short-lived 
because it has caught the attention of Congress. 
B. LEGISLATIVE ACTION 
Individuals in the political arena have taken notice of Iqbal as well.  On 
July 22, 2009, United States Senator Arlen Specter introduced legislation 
that would effectively reverse the Court’s decisions in Twombly and 
Iqbal.180  The Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009 provides “a Federal 
court shall not dismiss a complaint under rule 12(b)(6) or (e) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, except under the standards set forth by the 
Supreme Court of the United States in Conley v. Gibson.”181  In introducing 
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the Act, Senator Spector remarked, “The effect of the Court’s actions [in 
Twombly and Iqbal] will no doubt be to deny many plaintiffs with merito-
rious claims access to the Federal courts and, with it, any legal redress for 
their injuries.”182  The Act was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
where it awaits further action.183  Congress is not the only group taking 
action, however, as the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund has 
decided to undertake the cause of undoing the effects of Twombly and 
Iqbal.184  As part of its strategy, the NAACP will push to amend Rule 8’s 
pleading standard through the difficult rulemaking process.185  While 
Iqbal’s impact on the federal level is taking shape, it is still uncertain what 
effect it will have on North Dakota state courts. 
C. NORTH DAKOTA STATE COURTS 
The Court’s decision in Iqbal has no direct impact on North Dakota 
state courts because state courts are governed by their own rules of civil 
procedure.186  However, the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, includ-
ing the pleading rules, are modeled after the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.187 Moreover, the North Dakota Supreme Court has stated: 
[W]hen we adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure we did so 
with knowledge of the interpretations placed upon them by the 
Federal courts, and although we are not compelled to follow these 
interpretations, they are highly persuasive and, in the interest of 
uniform interpretation, we should be guided by them.188 
Further, the North Dakota Supreme Court currently uses Conley’s “no 
set of facts” language to interpret its own pleading standard.189  Accord-
ingly, it is possible that the rationale underlying Twombly and Iqbal may 
influence how the North Dakota rules are construed in the future. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the United States Supreme Court further refined 
and explained the “plausibility” pleading standard devised in Bell Atlantic 
Corp. v. Twombly.190  For all complaints in federal court to survive dis-
missal, they must contain sufficient, nonconclusory factual allegations that 
suggest plausible entitlement to relief.191  The Court stated that while 
Iqbal’s nonconclusory allegations against Ashcroft and Mueller were con-
sistent with discriminatory conduct, these assertions were more likely 
explained by lawful behavior.192  As such, the Court held Iqbal’s complaint 
insufficient to state a plausible claim of purposeful, unconstitutional 
discrimination by Ashcroft and Muller.193 
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